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ABSTRACT  
This paper presents an efficient hardware implementation of cryptoprocessors that perform the scalar multiplication kP over a finite 
field GF(2163) using two digit-level multipliers. The finite field arithmetic operations were implemented using the Gaussian normal basis 
(GNB) representation, and the scalar multiplication kP was implemented using the Lopez-Dahab algorithm, the 2-non-adjacent form 
(2-NAF) halve-and-add algorithm and the wNAF method for Koblitz curves. The processors were designed using a VHDL description, 
synthesized on the Stratix-IV FPGA using Quartus II 12.0 and verified using SignalTAP II and Matlab. The simulation results show that the 
cryptoprocessors provide a very good performance when performing the scalar multiplication kP. In this case, the computation times 
of the multiplication kP using the Lopez-Dahab algorithm, 2-NAF halve-and-add algorithm and 16NAF method for Koblitz curves were 
13.37 µs, 16.90 µs and 5.05 µs, respectively. 
Keywords: elliptic curve cryptography, Gaussian normal basis, digit-level multiplier, scalar multiplication. 
 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se presenta la implementación eficiente en hardware de criptoprocesadores que permiten llevar a cabo la multipli-
cación escalar kP sobre el campo finito GF(2163) usando dos multiplicadores a nivel de digito. Las operaciones aritméticas de campo 
finito fueron implementadas usando la representación de bases normales Gaussianas (GNB), y la multiplicación escalar kP fue imple-
mentada usando el algoritmo de López-Dahab, el algoritmo de bisección de punto 2NAF y el método wNAF para curvas de 
Koblitz. Los criptoprocesadores fueron diseñados usando descripción VHDL, sintetizados en el FPGA Stratix-IV usando Quartus II 12.0 y 
verificados usando SignalTAP II y Matlab. Los resultados de simulación muestran que los criptoprocesadores presentan un muy buen 
desempeño para llevar a cabo la multiplicación escalar kP. En este caso, los tiempos de computo de la multiplicación kP usando 
Lopez-Dahab, bisección de punto 2NAF y 16NAF para curvas de Koblitz fueron 13.37 µs, 16.90 µs and 5.05 µs, respectivamente. 
Palabras clave: criptografía de curva elíptica, bases normales Gaussianas, multiplicador a nivel de digito, multiplicación escalar. 
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Introduction123 
The use of computer networks and the steady increase in the 
number of users of these systems have driven the need to improve 
security for the storage and transmission of information. There 
are many applications that must ensure the privacy, integrity or 
authentication of the information stored or transmitted. The se-
curity of the applications has been resolved by using different cryp-
tographic algorithms, which are used in private- or public-key 
cryptosystems. 
The security of public-key cryptosystems is based on mathematical 
problems that are computationally difficult to resolve, i.e., prob-
lems for which there are no known algorithms to resolve them in 
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a practical time. Because of the high volume of information pro-
cessed, electronic systems are required to perform the encryption 
and decryption processes in the shortest time possible without 
compromising the security. In this regard, hardware implementa-
tions of cryptographic algorithms have advantages, such as high 
speed, high security levels and low cost.  
One of the most important cryptosystems is the elliptic curve 
cryptosystem (ECC), proposed independently by Koblitz (Kobliz, 
1987) and Miller (Miller, 1986). There have been several investiga-
tions of the theory and practice of this cryptosystem. The results 
of the investigations demonstrated the ability of these systems to 
encrypt information and concluded that this cryptosystem offers 
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better security, efficiency and memory usage. The hardware im-
plementations of ECCs have many advantages and are used in 
equipment such as ATMs, smart cards, telephones, and cell 
phones. 
In elliptic curve cryptography, it is known that finding the discrete 
logarithm of a random elliptic curve element with respect to a 
publicly known base point, that is, the elliptic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem or ECDLP, has high hardness. The entire security 
of the ECC depends on the ability to compute the scalar multipli-
cation and the inability to compute the multiplicand given the orig-
inal and product points. Furthermore, the finite-field size of the 
elliptic curve determines the computational complexity of the 
above problem.  
Several works regarding scalar multiplication over a finite field 
GF(2m) have been proposed and implemented efficiently in hard-
ware.  
C. Rebeiro and D. Mukhopadhyay (Rebeiro and Mukhopadhyay, 
2008) presented a cryptoprocessor with novel multiplication and 
inversion algorithms. J.Y. Lai, T.Y. Hung, K.H. Yang and C.T. Huang 
(Lai et al., 2010) proposed an architecture for elliptic curves along 
with the operation scheduling for the Montgomery scalar multipli-
cation algorithm. B. Muthukumar and S. Jeevananthan (Muthuku-
mar and Jeevanahthan, 2010) implemented an elliptic curve co-
processor, which is a dual-field processor with a projective coor-
dinate. A.K. Rahuman and G. Athisha (Rahuman and Athisha, 2010) 
presented an architecture using the Lopez-Dahab algorithm for 
the elliptic curve point multiplication and Gaussian normal basis 
(GNB) for field arithmetic over GF(2163). M. Amara and A. Siad 
(Amara and Siad, 2011) proposed an EC point multiplication pro-
cessor intended for cryptographic applications such as digital sig-
natures and key agreement protocols. X. Cui and J. Yang (Cui and 
Yang, 2012) implemented a processor that parallelizes the compu-
tations of the ECC at the bit-level and gains a considerable speed-
up. The processor is fully implemented in hardware and supports 
key lengths of 113 bits, 163 bits and 193 bits.  
In this context, we present in this work efficient hardware imple-
mentations of cryptoprocessors over GF(2163) using a GNB repre-
sentation and the Lopez-Dahab algorithm, 2-NAF halve-and-add 
algorithm and w-NAF method for Koblitz curves (Anomalous Bi-
nary Curves or ABC)  with window sizes of 2, 4, 8 and 16 to 
perform the scalar multiplication kP.  
The main contributions of this work are: (i) the hardware design 
of cryptoprocessors using the GNB over GF(2163) and three scalar 
multiplication algorithms (Lopez-Dahab, halve-and-add and w-
NAF method for Koblitz curves)  to determine the best crypto-
processor for embedded cryptographic applications. (ii) an effi-
cient hardware implementation of cryptoprocessors based on the 
w-NAF method with different window sizes for the Koblitz 
curves. They present the best trade-off between the computation 
time and area, obtaining a higher performance than the other cryp-
toprocessors reported in the literature. Additionally, they are very 
suitable for hardware cryptosystems. 
Mathematical background 
GNB representation 
ANSI X9.62 (ANSI, 1999) describes the detailed specifications of 
the ECC protocols and uses the GNB to represent the finite field 
elements (NIST, 2000). An element over GF(2m) has the compu-
tational  advantage  of performing squaring very  efficiently.  How- 
ever, multiplying distinct elements can be cumbersome. In this 
case, there are multiplication algorithms that make this operation 
both simpler and more efficient. 
A normal basis over GF(2m) is as follows: 
{, 2, 2
2
, … , 2
𝑚−1
} (1) 
where   GF(2m) and any element A ∈ GF(2m) can be written as 
follows: 
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The type T of a GNB is a positive integer and measures the com-
plexity of the multiplication operation with respect to that basis. 
Generally, the type T of a smaller value provides a more efficient 
multiplication. For a given m and T, the field GF(2m) can have at 
most one GNB of type T. A GNB exists whenever m is not divisi-
ble by 8. Let m and T be two positive integers. Then, the type T of 
a GNB over GF(2m) exists if and only if p =Tm+1 is prime.  
If  {, 2, 2
2
, … , 2
𝑚−1
} is a GNB over GF(2m), then the element 
𝐴 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
2𝑖  𝑚−1𝑖=0  is represented by the binary string 
(𝑎0𝑎1𝑎2 … 𝑎𝑚−1), where 𝑎𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, the multiplica-
tive identity element is represented by the bit string of all ones. 
The additive identity element is represented by the bit string of all 
zeros. An important result for the GNB arithmetic is Fermat’s 
Theorem. For all   GF(2m), then 
2
𝑚
=  (3) 
This theorem is important for performing the squaring of an ele-
ment over GF(2m). 
Finite field arithmetic operations 
The following arithmetic operations can be performed over 
GF(2m) when using a normal basis of type T. 
Addition: If A = (a0a1a2…am-1) and B = (b0b1b2…bm-1) are elements 
over GF(2m), then A + B = C = (c0c1c2…cm-1), where ci = (ai + bi) 
mod 2. 
Squaring: Let A = (a0a1a2…am-1)  GF(2m), then 
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Based on Fermat’s Theorem, 2
𝑚
= , then 
 2101
2 ...  mm aaaaA  (5) 
In this case, squaring is a simple rotation of the vector represen-
tation. 
Multiplication: The multiplication C = AB is based on the multipli-
cation matrix 𝑅(𝑚−1)×𝑇 (Masoleh, 2006). If A = (a0a1a2…am-1) and 
B = (b0b1b2…bm-1) are elements over GF(2m) and are represented 
using a GNB, then AB = C = (c0c1c2…cm-1), where the coefficient 
c0 is given by equation (6) 
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and 𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗), 0 ≤ 𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗) ≤ 𝑚 − 1, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 − 1, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑇 de-
notes the (i, j)th element of the 𝑅(𝑚−1)×𝑇 matrix. To obtain the 
ith coefficient of C, i.e., ci, add “i mod m” to all indices in (6). 
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Inversion: If A ≠ 0 and A  GF(2m), the inverse of A is C  GF(2m), 
and C is the only element of GF(2m) such that AC = 1, i.e., C = A-
1. The algorithm used to calculate the inversion is based on equa-
tion (7): 
 212221   mm AAA  (7) 
Itoh and Tsujii (Itoh and Tsujii, 1998) proposed a method that re-
duces the number of multiplications to calculate the inversion, and 
it is based on the following: 
 




















 

oddmifAA
evenmifAA
A m
m
m
m
m
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
12
22
 
(8) 
Trace: If A is an element over GF(2m), the trace of A is: 
12 222 ...)(


m
AAAAATr  (9) 
If A = (a0a1a2…am-1) and it is represented in a normal basis, then 
the trace can be computed efficiently as follows: 
110 ...)(  maaaATr  (10) 
The trace of the element A has two possible values (0 or 1). Quad-
ratic equation solving over GF(2m): If A is an element of GF(2m) 
represented in a normal basis, then the quadratic equation: 
Azz 2  (11) 
has 2  2T solutions over GF(2m), where T = Tr(A). Therefore, if T 
= 1, there is no solution, and if T = 0, there are two solutions. If z 
is one solution, then the other solution is z + 1. For example, if A 
= 0, the solutions are z = 0 and z = 1 (IEEE std 1363, 2000). The 
algorithm 1 calculates the quadratic equation over GF(2m) for a 
normal basis representation. 
Algorithm 1: Quadratic equation solving over GF(2m) 
Input: An element A ≠ 0 
Output: An element z for which z2 + z = A 
1. Let (a0a1…am-1) be the representation of A 
2. Set z0  0 
3. For i  from 0 to m  1 do 
         3.1 Set zi  zi-1  ai  
4. Return z  (z0z1…zm-1) 
Square root: Let A = (a0a1a2…am-1)  GF(2m), then 
 0121 ... aaaaA m  (12) 
In this case, the square root in a normal basis is a simple rotation 
of the vector representation (IEEE std 1363, 2000). 
Elliptic curve arithmetic 
A non-supersingular elliptic curve E(Fq) is defined as a set of points 
(x, y)  GF(2m)×GF(2m) that satisfies the affine coordinates equa-
tion, 
baxxxyy  232  (13) 
where a and b  Fq and are constants with b ≠ 0 together with the 
point at infinity denoted by O. The group operations for the elliptic 
curve arithmetic in affine coordinates are defined as follows. Let P 
= (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be two points that belong to the curve, 
and let the addition inverse of P be defined as P = (x1, x1 + y1). 
Then, if Q ≠ P, the point P + Q = (x3, y3) can be computed as: 




















QP
x
b
x
QPaxx
xx
yy
xx
yy
x
2
1
2
1
21
21
21
2
21
21
3
 
(14) 
 
 























QPxx
x
y
xx
QPyxxx
xx
yy
y
33
1
1
1
2
1
1331
21
21
3
 
(15) 
Using the group operations above, the elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication can be defined as follows. Let E be an elliptic curve over 
GF(2m), let Q and P  E be two arbitrary elliptic points satisfying 
equation (13), and let k be an arbitrary positive integer. Then, the 
elliptic curve scalar multiplication Q = kP is defined as: 

timesk
PPPkP  ...  
(16) 
Considering the group operations described in equations (14) and 
(15) using the finite field arithmetic in affine coordinates, three 
main elliptic curve operations can be defined: point addition, point 
doubling and point halving. In the group operations, the inversion 
is the arithmetic operation that is most expensive over GF(2m), 
and this operation can be avoided with a projective coordinate 
representation. In this case, the inversion is avoided by using the 
finite field multiplication. 
A point P in the projective coordinates is represented using three 
coordinates (X, Y and Z). For the Lopez-Dahab (LD) projective co-
ordinates (Lopez and Dahab, 1999), the projective point (X : Y : Z) 
with Z ≠ 0 corresponds to the affine coordinates x = X/Z and y = 
Y/Z2. Then, equation (13) can be mapped from the affine coordi-
nates to the LD projective coordinates as: 
42232 bZZaXZXXYZY   (17) 
The three group operations for the elliptic curve arithmetic in the 
projective and affine coordinates can be computed as (Menezes et 
al., 2003): 
1. Point doubling Q = 2P, where Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) and P = (X1 : Y1 
: Z1) in the projective coordinates, can be performed using 4 finite 
field multiplications, such as 
 4121333413
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2. Point addition Q + P, where Q = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) in the projective 
coordinates and P = (x2, y2) in the affine coordinates, can be per-
formed using 8 finite field multiplications, such as 
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(19) 
3. Point halving Q/2 is the inverse operation of point doubling. Let 
P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be the points over the curve (13) in the 
affine coordinates. The point halving operation is performed by 
computing P such that Q = 2P by solving the following equations: 
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ax  2
2   (20) 
 
)1(221  xyx  (21) 
 
2
111 xxy    (22) 
Let the -representation of a point Q = (x2, y2) be Q = (x, Q), 
where 
222 / xyxQ   (23) 
If Q in the -representation is the input of the point halving algo-
rithm, then it is possible to compute point halving without using 
the affine coordinates. In scalar multiplication, repeated point halv-
ing operations can be performed directly on the -representation. 
However, when a point addition is required, a conversion to the 
affine coordinates must be performed. Algorithm 2 computes the 
point halving operation. 
Algorithm 2: Point Halving 
Input: -representation (x2, Q) or affine representation (x2, y2) of Q 
Output: -representation (x1, P) of P = (x1, y1) 
1. Find a solution ̂ of  2̂ + ̂ = 𝑥2 + 𝑎 
2. If the input is a -representation, then 𝑡 = 𝑥2(𝑥2 + 𝑄 + ̂) 
    Else 𝑡 = 𝑥2 + 𝑥1̂ 
3. If Tr(t)=0 then 𝑃 ← ̂, 𝑥1 ← √𝑡 + 𝑥1 
    Else 𝑃 ← ̂ + 1, 𝑥1 ← √𝑡 
4. Return (𝑥1, 𝑃) 
Koblitz Curves 
Koblitz curves, or anomalous binary curves, are elliptic curves de-
fined over GF(2m). The main advantage of these curves is that the 
scalar multiplication operation can be performed without the use 
of point doubling operations. 
An algorithm for scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves is pre-
sented by Solinas (Solinas, 2000). The Solinas algorithm or the τ–
adic window method computes a special τ–adic expansion of an 
integer number in ℤ[τ]. For example, a special τ–adic expansion is 
the window τ–adic non-adjacent form (τNAF). 
The Koblitz curves are curves defined over GF(2m) by: 
132  axxxyyEa  (24) 
where a  {0,1}, that is, curves E0 and E1. 
These curves present the following property: If P(x, y) is a point 
on the curve Ea, then the point (x2, y2) is also a point on Ea. In 
addition, they satisfy (x4, y4) + 2(x, y) = µ(x2, y2) for each point (x, 
y) on Ea, where µ = (1)1a. In GF(2m), the Frobenius map  is an 
endomorphism that raises every element to its power of two, i.e., 
 : x → x2. Then, the Frobenius endomorphism is performed effi-
ciently (cost-free) when the elements of the finite field are repre-
sented in a normal basis (Cui and Yang, 2012). Koblitz shows that 
the point doubling operation can be performed efficiently by using 
the Frobenius endomorphism, if the binary curve is defined over 
GF(2m) and a ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the Frobenius map can be defined as 
: (x, y) → (x2, y2). In this case, if the scalar k is represented in 
NAF, then 

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ik  for ki  {0,1, –1}                (25) 
The –adic representation can be obtained by repeatedly dividing 
k by , where the remainders of each division step are named digits 
ui. This procedure is also used to obtain the representation’s NAF 
of the scalar k, namely, k is repeatedly divided by 2. To decrease 
the number of point additions for the scalar multiplication, it is 
necessary to obtain a NAF representation of k that achieves a 
smaller number of nonzero digits. The scalar multiplication can be 
computed as: 

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The result corresponds to the Hamming weight of the NAF, and 
it is equal to the binary NAF representation, i.e., the Hamming 
weight ≈ (log2 k)/3, and the length of the –adic representation of 
k is approximately 2m, which is twice the length of the binary NAF 
representation. However, Solinas presents a method that reduces 
the length of the –adic representation to approximately m. Thus, 
the Koblitz curves’ arithmetic is based on the point addition and 
Frobenius map . 
Hardware architectures for elliptic curve 
cryptoprocessors 
In this section, we present the hardware architectures for elliptic 
curve cryptoprocessors over GF(2163) using a Gaussian normal ba-
sis. Each cryptoprocessor is designed using one algorithm for the 
scalar multiplication, namely, the Lopez-Dahab algorithm (Lopez 
and Dahab, 1999), the halve-and-add 2-NAF algorithm (Menezes 
et al., 2000) and the w-NAF method for Koblitz curves with w = 
2, 4, 8 and 16 (Solinas, 2000).  
Digit-level multiplier 
The finite field multiplication over GF(2m) is an operation that is 
more important for performing the scalar multiplication. Thus, this 
operation must be implemented efficiently in hardware. There are 
several algorithms for performing the finite field multiplication that 
are presented in Azarderakhsh and Masoleh (2010), Huang et al. 
(2011,), Wang and Fan (2012) Lee and Chiou (2012). 
Azarderakhsh and Masoleh (Azarderakhsh and Masoleh, 2010) 
proposed a serial or parallel digit-level multiplier with a digit-size 
d, where 1 ≤ d ≤ m. In this case, if d = m, the multiplier is parallel 
and if d < m, it is serial and requires M = m/d, 1 ≤ M ≤ m, clock 
cycles to generate all the m coefficients of C = AB = (c0c1c2…cm-
1), where A = (a0a1a2…am-1) and B = (b0b1b2…bm-1) are elements 
represented in a GNB over GF(2m). Figure 1 shows the digit-level 
GF(2m) multiplier for T = 4, where A, B and C are registers for 
storing the input and output elements.  
A
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Figure 1.  Digit-level Multiplier 
The block r is formed by the blocks r1 and r2, and its structure 
depends on type T of the GBN with T  2 and the multiplication 
matrix R. The block J is a set of m, two-input AND gates. The 
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block CS is a d-fold cyclic shift and an adder GF (2163), which is a 
set of two-input XOR gates. 
The block r1 is an optimal set of XOR gates that are ob-
tained using (27), and r2 is a set of XOR gates that are ob-
tained from the main matrix r: 
10),,2/)1((,...,
),...,2(),,1(,()(
'
0
'
0
'
01

 
dkkBms
kBskBsbBP kk                  
 



kRi
kibBks ),(
'
0
 
(27) 
The time complexity of the digit-level multiplier is TA + (2 + 
log2m)TX, where TX and TA are the delay time of a two-
input XOR gate and a two-input AND gate, respectively. 
The area complexity of this multiplier is m2 ANDs and  
2m2 – 2m XORs (Azarderakhsh and Masoleh, 2010).    
To implement the digit-level multiplier with a digit-size d = 
55 in hardware, that is M = 3 clock cycles, a Matlab code is 
written to generate the equations of the blocks r1 and r2, 
which are synthesized using VHDL.  
Hardware architecture using the Lopez-Dahab algo-
rithm 
The scalar multiplication kP for non-supersingular elliptic curves 
over binary fields using the Lopez-Dahab algorithm is shown in 
Algorithm 3, which is a modified version of the Montgomery algo-
rithm, where the same operations are performed during each it-
eration of the main loop (D. Hankerson et al., 2003). 
Algorithm 3: Montgomery point multiplication 
Input: k = (kt1,…,k1k0) with kt1 = 1, P = (x, y)  GF(2
m) 
Output: kP 
1. X1 ← x, Z1 ← 1, X2 ← x
4 + b, Z2 ← x
2 
2. For i from t - 2 downto 0 do 
3.          if ki = 1 then 
               3.1 T ← Z1, Z1 ← (X1Z2 + X2Z1)
2, X1 ← xZ1 + X1X2TZ2 
               3.2 T ← X2, X2 ← X2
4 + bZ2
4, Z2 ← T
2Z2
2 
4.          else 
               4.1 T ← Z2, Z2 ← (X1Z2 + X2Z1)
2, X2 ← xZ2 + X1X2TZ1 
               4.2 T ← X1, X1 ← X1
4 + bZ1
4, Z1 ← T
2Z1
2 
5. x3 ← X1/Z1 
   y3 ← (x +
X1
Z1
) [(X1 + xZ1)(X2 + xZ2) + (x
2 + y)(Z1Z2)](xZ1Z2)
−1 +
y 
6. Return (x3, y3) 
In this case, the scalar multiplication is performed in three steps: 
1) conversion of P from affine to projective coordinates; 2) com-
pute Q = kP by addition and doubling; and 3) conversion of Q from 
projective to affine coordinates.         
To implement the above algorithm in hardware, we initially define 
three functions: Madd() performs the point addition, Mdouble() per-
forms the point doubling and  Mxy() performs the conversion from 
projective to affine coordinates. These functions are defined as 
follows: 
)},(Return
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
  
where, (x, y) and (x3, y3) are the coordinates of points P and Q = 
kP, respectively.     
Point addition and point doubling are implemented in hardware 
using the data dependence graph shown in Figure 2, and the con-
version from the projective to affine coordinates is implemented 
using two digit-level multipliers for the data dependence graph 
shown in Figure 3. The inversion operation is implemented using 
the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm (Itoh and Tsujii, 1998). 
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Figure 2.  Data dependence graph for Madd and Mdouble 
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Figure 3.  Data dependence graph for conversion of the projective 
to affine coordinates    
According to Figures 2 and 3, the latencies for Madd and Mdouble and 
the projective to affine conversion are 3M and 15M +1, respec-
tively, where M is the latency for a finite field multiplication.  
In step 4 of Figure 3, two multipliers are used, and one of them 
with the block of rotation performs the inversion of an element A 
 GF(2163). In this case, the latency of the inversion is 10M because 
it needs 10 finite field multiplications for m = 163. In step 6, a 
multiplier is only used because the last operation of the coordinate 
conversion requires a multiplication. 
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The architecture of the cryptoprocessor over GF(2163) using the 
Lopez-Dahab algorithm is shown in Figure 4. It uses two register 
files, two parallel digit-level multipliers, one inversion block, sev-
eral squaring and adder blocks, a main control and an FSM to per-
form the point addition, point double and conversion from the 
projective to affine coordinates. 
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Figure 4. Elliptic curve cryptoprocessor using the Lopez-Dahab al-
gorithm 
The functional blocks that perform the finite field arithmetic op-
erations over GF(2163) for the Lopez-Dahab cryptoprocessor are 
shown in Figure 5. It is important to mention that the performance 
of any cryptoprocessor depends on the efficient implementation 
of the hardware for the finite field arithmetic. 
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Figure 5. Functional blocks of the finite field arithmetic 
The main control is an FSM that generates the control signals to 
perform the scalar multiplication, process the key, initialize the 
cryptoprocessor and control the I/O registers. The second FSM 
performs the point addition, point doubling and conversion from 
the projective to the affine coordinates. 
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Figure 6. ASM chart of the main control 
In Figure 6, the ASM chart of the main control is shown, where 
the variables X1, Z1, X2 and Z2 are initialized and stored in the 
register files. Each bit of the scalar k is evaluated from left to right 
to perform the operations Madd and Mdouble using the data depend-
ence graph shown in Figure 2. If the bit ki is ‘1’, then 
Madd(X1,Z1,X2,Z2), Mdouble(X2,Z2) are computed. Else, 
Madd(X2,Z2,X1,Z1), Mdouble(X1,Z1). When all bits of the scalar k are 
evaluated, the conversion from the projective to affine coordi-
nates is executed using the data dependence graph shown in Figure 
3, and kP in the affine coordinates is stored in the output register. 
Algorithm 3 is more resistant against simple power analysis and 
timing attacks. This is because the computation cost does not de-
pend on the specific bit of the scalar k. For each bit of the scalar 
k, one point addition and one point doubling are performed. The 
proposed scheme has two different execution paths depending on 
the current bit of the scalar k. Both execution paths have the same 
complexity and require the same number of clock cycles. 
Hardware architecture using the halve-and-add al-
gorithm 
Schroeppel (Schroeppel, 2000) and Knudsen (Knudsen, 1999) in-
dependently proposed the halve-and-add algorithm to accelerate 
the scalar multiplication on the elliptic curves defined over the bi-
nary extension fields. This algorithm uses an elliptic curve primitive 
called point halving as shown in algorithm 2. 
Because, theoretically, the point halving operation is three times 
faster than the point doubling operation, it is possible to accelerate 
the scalar multiplication Q = kP by replacing the double-and-add 
algorithm with the halve-and-add algorithm, which uses an expan-
sion of the scalar k in terms of negative powers of 2 (Mercurio et 
al., 2006).   
In the halve-and-add algorithm, it is necessary to transform the 
integer k = (km-1,…,k0)2. If k´ is defined by 
)(mod2/,...,2/ '0
'
1
1'
1 nkkkk
t
t 


 (28) 
where n represents the order of the base point P, then 




1
0
' 2/
t
i
i
i PkkP  (29) 
Equation (29) can be generalized to a window-NAF. The NAFw of 
a positive integer k and w  2 is represented by the expression 
𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖2
𝑖𝑙−1
𝑖=0 , where each nonzero coefficient ki is odd and at 
most, one of any w consecutive digits is nonzero. In this case, the 
NAFw of k can be computed using algorithm 4. 
Algorithm 4: NAFw of a positive integer 
Input: Window width w, positive integer k. 
Output: NAFw(k) 
1. i  0 
2. While k  1 do 
     2.1 If k is odd then ki  k mods 2w, k  k  ki 
     2.2 Else ki  0 
     2.3 k  k/2, i  i+1 
3. Return (ki1,…,k1, k0) 
In this work, a Maple code is written to obtain the expansion co-
efficients NAFw with w = 2, namely, the coefficients NAFw(2t-1 k 
mod n), which are represented by 2-bits. 
The halve-and-add algorithm is shown in algorithm 5. Step 3 of the 
algorithm performs the point addition Qi + P in the Lopez-Dahab 
mixed coordinates (Qi and P are represented in LD projective and 
affine coordinates, respectively) using equation (14) and the halv-
ing point P/2 in the affine coordinates or -representation, if bit ki´ 
≠ 0; else, compute point halving. In this case, it is important to 
mention that if the results of the first two operations A and B of 
equation (19) are equal to zero, the point doubling 2P is performed 
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in the LD projective coordinates using equation (18) with X1 = x2, 
Y1 = y2 and Z1 = 1. 
Algorithm 5: Halve-and-add w-NAF point multiplication  
Input: Window width w, NAFw(2
t−1 k mod n) = ∑ ki
′2iti=0 , P ∈ GF(2
m) 
Output: kP 
1. Set Qi ← ∞ for i ∈ I = {1, 3, 5, … . 2
w−1 − 1}  
2. if kt
′ = 1 then Q1 = 2P        
3. For i from t - 1 downto 0 do  
       3.1 if ki
′ > 0 then Qki′ ← Qki′ + P 
       3.2 if ki
′ < 0 then Q−ki′ ← Q−ki′ − P 
       3.3 P ← P/2 
4. Q ← ∑ iQii∈I  
5. Return (Q) 
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Figure 7. Data dependence graph for point addition 
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Figure 8. Data dependence graph for point doubling 
The point addition in the LD mixed coordinates and the point 
doubling in the LD projective coordinates are implemented in 
hardware using the data dependence graphs shown in Figure 7 and 
Figure 8, respectively. According to Figures 7 and 8, the latencies 
for the point addition and point doubling are 5M and M + 3, re-
spectively.  
The architecture of the cryptoprocessor over GF(2163) using the 
halve-and-add algorithm is shown in Figure 9, and it uses two reg-
ister files, two digit-level finite multipliers, one solving quadratic 
equation block, one point halving block, several squaring and adder 
blocks, a main control and an FSM to perform the point addition, 
point doubling and point halving. 
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Figure 9. Elliptic curve cryptoprocessor using the halve-and-add al-
gorithm 
The functional blocks that perform the finite field arithmetic op-
erations over GF(2163) for the halve-and-add cryptoprocessor are 
shown in Figure 10. In this case, finite field arithmetic operations 
are the addition, squarer, square root, trace, half trace (quadratic 
equation solving in a normal basis) and multiplication. 
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Figure 10. Blocks of the finite field arithmetic 
The main control is an FSM that generates the control signals to 
perform the scalar multiplication, process the key, initialize the 
cryptoprocessor and control the I/O registers. The second FSM 
performs the point addition, point doubling and point halving.  
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Figure 11. ASM chart of the main control 
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In Figure 11, the ASM chart of the main control is shown, where 
the sequence processing is as follows: initialize coordinate Q ac-
cording to the sign of the bit 𝑘𝑡−1
′ ; perform the point halving op-
eration on P; evaluate the bit 𝑘𝑖
′ for i > t1; compute the point 
addition in the LD mixed coordinates and point halving on P if 𝑘𝑖
′ 
 0, else compute point halving; and perform the conversion of 
the point P in the -representation to the affine coordinates only 
when a point addition is required. Finally, Q = kP is obtained in the 
LD projective coordinates. 
Algorithm 7 performs the rounding of a complex number 0 + 1 
with 0 and 1  ℚ to obtain an element  ℤ[]. 
Hardware architecture using the w-τNAF algorithm 
The length of the –adic representation for k = d0 + d1  ℤ[] is 
roughly twice log2(max(d0, d1)). Solinas (Solinas, 2000) presents a 
method that reduces the length of the –adic representation. The 
objective is to find r  ℤ[] of small norm with r  k (mod δ), 
where δ = (m  1)/(  1), and use NAF(r) to calculate rP.  
Algorithm 6 calculates an element r´  k (mod δ), which is also 
written as r´ = k partmod δ. Solinas proved that l(r) ≤ m + a and 
if C  2, then l(r´) ≤ m + a + 3. 
Algorithm 6: Partial reduction modulo δ=(τm  1)/(τ  1) 
Input: k  [n  1], C  2, s0 = d0  µd1, Vm, s1 = d1 
Output: r´ = k partmod δ 
1. k´= k/2a-C+(m-9)/2 
2. For i from 0 to 1 do 
    2.1 g´si.k´   j´Vm.g´/2m 
    2.2 i  (g´+j´)/2(m+5)/2 + 1/2/2C 
3. Use Algorithm 7 to compute (q0, q1)Round(0, 1)  
4. r0k(s0 + µs1)q02s1q1    r1s1q0s0q1 
5. Return r0+r1τ 
 
Algorithm 7: Rounding off 
Input: Rational numbers 0 and 1 
Output: Integers q0 and q1 
1. For i from 0 to 1 do 
     fi  i+1/2   ni  i  fi    hi  0  
2. n 2n0+µn1 
3. If n  1 then 
       3.1 If n0  3µn1< 1 then h1  µ; else h0  1 
       Else 
       3.2 If n0  4µn1  2  then h1  µ 
4. If n < 1 then 
       4.1 If n0  3µn1  1  then h1  µ; else h0  1 
       Else 
       4.2 If n0  4µn1 < 2  then h1  µ 
5. q0  f0 + h0, q1  f1 + h1 
6. Return (q0, q1) 
Let w  2 be a positive integer, and αi = i mod w for i  {1, 3, 5,…, 
2w-1 ‒1}. A w‒NAF expansion of an nonzero element   Z[] is 
an expression: 




1
0
l
i
i
iur  (30) 
where ui  {0, α1, α3,…, α2w-1‒1}, ul‒1 ≠ 0 and at most, one of 
any w consecutive digits is nonzero. Then, kP = αu0P + αu1P + … 
+ l‒1αl‒1P, when the scalar k is represented in w‒NAF. 
The w-NAF expansion can be efficiently computed using algo-
rithm 8, which can be viewed as an approach similar to the general 
NAF algorithm. In this work, a Maple code is written to obtain the 
expansion w‒NAF of the scalar k with w = 2, 4 and 8, generating 
8-bit expansion coefficients and w = 16, generating 16-bit expan-
sion coefficients. 
Algorithm 8: Computing a w‒NAF of an element in ℤ[] 
Input: w, t, r = r0 + r1  ℤ[], αu = βu + γu for u  {1, 3, 5,…,2-1 - 1} 
Output: w‒τNAF(r) 
1. i  0 
2. While r0 ≠ 0 or r1 ≠ 0 do 
     2.1 If r0 is odd then 
                u  r0 + r1t mods 2w 
                If u > 0 then s  1; else s  ‒1, u  ‒u 
                r0  r0 ‒ sβu, r1  r1 ‒ sγu, ui  sαu. 
     2.2 Else: ui  0 
     2.3 t  r0, r0  r1 + r0/2, r1  ‒t/2, i  i + 1 
3.  Return (ui‒1, ui‒2,…,u1, u0) 
Solinas proposed algorithms to compute kP using the window 
NAF method for the scalar k, namely, kP is calculated using the 
w-NAF method and Horner’s rule (Solinas, 2000). An efficient 
scalar multiplication algorithm that uses the w-NAF method is 
presented in algorithm 9, where step 1 calculates the w-NAF of 
the scalar k with the partial reduction modulo  = (m1)/(1), 
namely, w-NAF(r  k mod()), where r  k mod() is obtained 
from algorithms 6 and 7; step 2 generates the multiples of the 
point P and step 4.2 performs the point addition Q + Pu, when the 
bit ui ≠ 0, and point doubling 2Q, when the results of the two first 
operations A and B of equation (19) are equal to zero.  
Algorithm 9: w‒NAF point multiplication method for Koblitz 
curves 
Input: Window width w, integer k ∈ [1, n − 1], P  GF(2m) of order n 
Output: kP 
1. Compute wNAF(r  k mod()) = ∑ uiτ
il−1
i=0  
2. Compute Pu = αuP, for u ∈ {1, 3, 5, … , 2
w−1 − 1} 
3. Q ← ∞ 
4. For i from l −1 downto 0 do  
       4.1 Q ← τQ 
       4.2 if ui ≠ 0 then 
                    Let u be such that αu = ui or α−u = −ui 
                    If u > 0 then Q ← Q + Pu 
                    Else Q ← Q − P−u 
5. Return Q 
The point addition in the LD mixed coordinates and the point 
doubling in the LD projective coordinates with b = 1 are imple-
mented in hardware using the data dependence graphs shown in 
Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.  
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Figure 12. Elliptic curve cryptoprocessor for Koblitz curves 
The architecture of the cryptoprocessor over GF(2163) using the 
w-NAF algorithm for Koblitz curves is shown in Figure 12, and it 
uses two register files, two digit-level finite multipliers, one Fro-
benius map block, one RAM that stores the expansion coefficients 
w-NAF of the scalar k, two ROMs that store the pre-computed 
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points Pu in the affine coordinates, which were obtained from 
Matlab for w = 2, 4, 8 and 16, several squaring and adder blocks, a 
main control and an FSM to perform the point addition, point dou-
bling and Q. 
The functional blocks that perform the finite field arithmetic op-
erations over GF(2163) for the wNAF cryptoprocessor for Ko-
blitz curves are shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Blocks of the finite field arithmetic 
The main control is an FSM that generates the control signals to 
perform the scalar multiplication, process the key, initialize the 
cryptoprocessor and control the I/O registers. The second FSM 
performs the point addition, point doubling and Q. 
In Figure 14, the ASM chart of the main control is shown, where 
the sequence processing is as follows: initialize the Q coordinate 
according to the sign of the bit ui of the w-NAF expansion; eval-
uate the bits ui for i > t1; and compute the point addition in the 
LD mixed coordinates and the Frobenius map  on Q, if ui  0. 
Else, compute Q. Finally, Q = kP is obtained in the LD projective 
coordinates. In Figure 14, the ASM of the FSM is shown. One im-
portant remark is that the Koblitz curves are resistant to simple 
power analysis and to all the known special attacks (T. Juhas, 
2007). 
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Figure 14. ASM chart of the main FSM 
Hardware verification and synthesis  
results 
The López-Dahab, halve-and-add and w-NAF cryptoprocessors 
are described using generic structural VHDL, are synthesized for 
a digit-size of d = 55 on the Stratix-IV FPGA (EP4SGX180HF35C2) 
using the Altera Quartus II version 12 design software for the im-
plementation and are verified using SignalTap II and Matlab. 
Hardware verification of the cryptoprocessors 
To verify the synthesis and simulation results of the cryptoproces-
sors, the following parameters for a pseudo-random elliptic curve 
are used according to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST, 2000): 
1. Random elliptic curves B163: 
The form of the curve is: y2 + xy = x3 + x + b 
Gx = 3F0EBA16286A2D57EA0991168D4994637E8343E36 
Gy = 0D51FBC6C71A0094FA2CDD545B11C5C0C7973244F1     
b = 20A601907B8C953CA1481EB10512F78744A3205FD 
 
2. Koblitz elliptic curves K163 
The form of the curve is: y2 + xy = x3 + x + 1 
Gx = 2FE13C0537BBC11ACAA07D793DE4E6D5E5C94EEE8 
Gy = 289070FB05D38FF58321F2E800536D538CCDAA3D9     
n = 4000000000000000000020108A2E0CC0D99F8A5EF 
     
In Figures 15 through 17, the simulation results for the cryptopro-
cessors over GF(2163) in a GNB using SignalTAP II and Matlab are 
shown. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 15.  Simulation results for the Lopez-Dahab cryptoprocessor. 
(a) Results from SignalTAP II (b) Results from Matlab 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 16.  Simulation results for the halve-and-add cryptoproces-
sor. (a) Results from SignalTAP II (b) Results from Matlab 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 17.  Simulation results for the Koblitz curves cryptoprocessor. 
(a) Results from SignalTAP II (b) Results from Matlab 
From Figures 15 through 17, we can see that the results obtained 
from Matlab are the same as the results from SignalTAP II. Then, 
the hardware results verify the correct functionality of the de-
signed cryptoprocessors. 
Synthesis results for the cryptoprocessors 
The synthesis results of the cryptoprocessors over GF(2163) are 
shown in Table 1. Additionally, some of the data presented in Ta-
ble I are plotted in Figure 18. 
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Table 1. Synthesis results for the cryptoprocessors 
Cryptoprocessor 
Area 
(ALUTs) 
Fmax 
(MHz) 
Registers 
kP 
(µs) 
TA 
Lopez-Dahab 24882 215.3 2608 13.37 0.33 
Halving 2-NAF 22670 158.2 2572 16.90 0.38 
Koblitz 2-NAF 24223 226.6 2046 9.88 0.23 
Koblitz 4-NAF 24257 226.7 2050 7.37 0.17 
Koblitz 8-NAF 24249 211.6 2108 6.17 0.14 
Koblitz 16-NAF 24270 177.1 2135 5.05 0.12 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 18.  (a) Area resources. (b) Frequency. (c) Registers re-
sources. (d) Time to perform the scalar multiplication of each cryp-
toprocessor.   
From Figure 18, we can see that the w‒NAF cryptoprocessor-
with w = 16 performs the scalar multiplication at a faster time (5.05  
s), and the halve-and-add processor with w = 2 uses fewer area 
resources than the other processors. 
Comparison of the results with other works  
To compare the performance of the designed cryptoprocessors 
with respect to the cryptoprocessors presented in the literature, 
Table 2 shows several design parameters and processing times, 
such as area resources, frequency, kP time and time-area product. 
However, it is important to mention that performing a fair com-
parison in hardware design is very difficult because there are other 
technical considerations, including the technologies, hardware 
platforms, software tools, scalar multiplication algorithms, finite 
field representations, and size of the fields. 
From Table 2, it is possible to observe that the GF(2163) crypto-
processor presented in Mahadizadeh et al (2013) requires less 
time to perform the scalar multiplication than our processor based 
on the Lopez-Dahab algorithm because the first processor uses 
three digit-level multipliers, and our design uses two digit-level 
multipliers, and the latency to compute Madd and Mdouble is 3M. 
However, the first processor requires more area than our pro-
cessor. Mercurio et al (2006) computes kP by using the half-and-
add algorithm, m=163, polynomial bases representation and one 
parallel multiplier. Our processor requires more area than the 
mentioned processor because it uses two digit-level multipliers, 
but our design requires less time to perform the scalar multiplica-
tion, and the latency to compute the point addition is 5M. Finally, 
our processor is based on the Koblitz curves and has a higher 
performance (area and time) than the processor presented in 
Azarderakhsh (2013) because our design has a latency of 5M to 
compute the point addition, and it uses two digit-level multipliers 
and a window method that allows us to reduce the amount of 
point addition operations. 
Table 2. Performance comparison results  
Design FPGA Area 
Freq. 
(MHz) 
kP 
(µs) 
TA 
(Trujillo and Velasco, 2010) Stratix III 18567 ALUTs 97.51 60 1.11 
(Malik, 2010) TMS320 - 160 63400 - 
(Sandoval et al., 2011) Virtex 4 4586 LUTs 100 1070 4.90 
(Nabil et al., 2012) Xilinx 2502 LUTs 213 254 0.63 
(Mercurio et al., 2006) Virtex E 11616 LUTs 41 25.0 0.29 
(Azarderakhsh et al., 2013) Stratix II 46168 ALUTs 188.7 9.15 0.42 
(Mahdizadeh et al., 2013) Virtex 4 33414 LUTs 250 9.60 0.32 
This work Lopez-Dahab Stratix IV 24882 ALUTs 215.3 13.37 0.33 
This work  Halving Stratix IV 22670 ALUTs 158.2 16.90 0.38 
This work 2-NAF Stratix IV 24223 ALUTs 226.6 9.88 0.23 
This work 4-NAF Stratix IV 24257 ALUTs 226.7 7.37 0.17 
This work 8-NAF Stratix IV 24249 ALUTs 211.6 6.17 0.14 
This work 16-NAF Stratix IV 24270 ALUTs 177.1 5.05 0.12 
From Table 2, it is possible to observe that the GF(2163) crypto-
processor presented in Mahadizadeh et al (2013) requires less 
time to perform the scalar multiplication than our processor based 
on the Lopez-Dahab algorithm because the first processor uses 
three digit-level multipliers, and our design uses two digit-level 
multipliers, and the latency to compute Madd and Mdouble is 3M. 
However, the first processor requires more area than our pro-
cessor. Mercurio et al (2006) computes kP by using the half-and-
add algorithm, m=163, polynomial bases representation and one 
parallel multiplier. Our processor requires more area than the 
mentioned processor because it uses two digit-level multipliers, 
but our design requires less time to perform the scalar multiplica-
tion, and the latency to compute the point addition is 5M. Finally,  
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our processor is based on the Koblitz curves and has a higher 
performance (area and time) than the processor presented in 
Azarderakhsh (2013) because our design has a latency of 5M to 
compute the point addition, and it uses two digit-level multipliers 
and a window method that allows us to reduce the amount of 
point addition operations.  
Conclusions 
This work presents the design of elliptic curve cryptoprocessors 
to compute the scalar multiplication over GF(2163) using the GNB. 
The Lopez-Dahab, halve-and-add and w‒NAF algorithms are 
used to design the cryptoprocessors, which are described using 
generic structural VHDL, synthesized on the Stratix IV FPGA 
(EP4SGX180HF35C2). 
Considering the hardware verification results, the 16-NAF cryp-
toprocessor performs the scalar multiplication in less time (5.05 
s), and the 2-NAF halve-and-add cryptoprocessor uses fewer 
area resources than the other processors, in this case, 22670 
ALUTs. All the cryptoprocessors use roughly 17% of the ALUTs 
of the FPGA. 
Additionally, it is important to mention that the algorithms are 
synthetized on the same hardware platform using Quartus II, are 
simulated in Modelsim, and are verified using SignalTAP and 
Matlab; the cryptoprocessors use two digit-level finite field multi-
pliers over GF(2163) in the GNB; the expansion coefficients for the 
private key k are obtained using the software Maple; and the FSMs 
use a data dependence graph to perform kP to achieve the minimal 
states. 
Future work will be oriented to increase the performance of the 
designed cryptoprocessors and the hardware implementation of 
the GF(2233) processors. Additionally, new cryptoprocessors will 
be designed based on elliptic curves that are not included in the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), such as the 
Hessian and Edwards curves that perform the scalar multiplication 
kP. 
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